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WEBSTER, PRIVACY, AND RU486
I. INTRODUCTION
Law is a living enterprise. For over a decade and a half, the Supreme
Court has protected a woman's right to an abortion from overreaching state
power.' Now, the Court's recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services 2 has expanded state protection of potential human life and maternal
health.' Advances in abortion technology - making abortions easier and
more accessible - will potentially spur state legislatures to amend abortion
legislation as necessary to ensure the protection of maternal health and po-
tential human life. Into this enterprise now comes the new drug RU486 4 -
the latest discovery in abortion technology. RU486, a pill that stimulates
miscarriage, is at the center of the latest conflict between a woman's right to
1. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court determined that the right to
privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy by means
of an abortion.
2. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
3. Though Webster only notes the existence of a compelling state interest in potential
human life throughout pregnancy, the same reasoning is also used to find a compelling state
interest in maternal health throughout pregnancy. See City of Akron v. Akron Center For
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 460-61 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting):
The fallacy inherent in the Roe framework is apparent: just because the State has a
compelling interest in ensuring maternal safety once an abortion may be more dan-
gerous than childbirth, it simply does not follow that the State has no interest before
that point that justifies State regulation to ensure that first trimester abortions are
performed as safely as possible .... [Accordingly,] the State possesses compelling
interests in the protection of potential human life and in maternal health throughout
pregnancy ....
The author notes that the Court, in the same term in which it expanded state protection of
fetal life in Webster, allowed the states to execute minors, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S.Ct.
2969 (1989), and the mentally retarded, Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (1989).
4. RU486 or mifepristone was created in 1982 by French researcher Dr. Etienne Bau-
lieu. Herman, Women's Health: In France, A New Method of Abortion, Wash. Post, Sept. 27,
1988, at 13 (Health), col. 1. RU486, usually given as a pill, induces a miscarriage in early
pregnancy causing the fetus to be expelled. Couzinet, Termination of Early Pregnancy by the
Progesterone Antagonist RU486 (Mifepristone), 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1565, 1568 (1986).
RU486 is currently available in France where it is dispensed only at designated family plan-
ning centers. The procedure requires two visits to the family planning center, first for inges-
tion of RU486 and then, some days later, for an injection of prostaglandin to induce uterine
contractions. Herman, The Politics of the Abortion Pill, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1989, at 12
(Health), col. 4. Dr. Baulieu received the 1989 Albert Lasker Award for Clinical Research for
his scientific achievements including his work on RU486. French Researcher Wins Top U.S.
Medical Award, Angering Abortion Foes, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1989, at A12, col. 1.
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an abortion established within the strict trimester guidelines of Roe v. Wade'
and the statutory protection of health, safety, and welfare by the individual
states.6
This Comment will examine the Webster decision and its possible effects
on the state regulation of abortions. To this end, RU486 is discussed - its
terminology, testing history, and potential benefits and consequences. This
Comment will conclude by discussing RU486 in the context of post Webster
abortion law, and will propose a model statute to demonstrate the expanded
possibilities of constitutional state abortion regulation.
II. WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES
In Webster, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld a Missouri
statute that restricts a woman's right to an abortion.7 The provisions of the
statute include: (1) a preamble that sets forth legislative "findings" that life
begins at conception and that unborn children have protected life interests,8
(2) a prohibition on the use of public facilities or public employees to per-
5. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159-64. States may regulate abortions after the first trimester ends
provided the regulations are reasonably related to maternal health. Id. at 164. After the sec-
ond trimester ends, the state may regulate abortions to the point of prohibition to protect
viable fetal life. Id. This is because the state's interest in maternal health and viable fetal life
"grow(s) in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling'." Id. at 162-63.
During the first trimester, the mortality rate for childbirth may be greater than or equal to
that of abortion, therefore the state has no compelling interest and thus no authority to regu-
late abortions. Id. at 163. During the second trimester, the state's interest in maternal health
is now compelling because the mortality rate for abortion becomes greater than for childbirth.
Id. at 163. During the third trimester, the fetus is presumed viable and the state may regulate
abortions, even to the point of prohibition, because the state has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting potential human life. Id. An exception is made to allow third trimester abortions to
"preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 163-64.
6. Through its police powers, the state may protect the "public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
7. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205, 188.205, 188.210, 188.029 (1989).
8. Id. at § 1.205 Life begins at conception - unborn child, defined - failure to provide
prenatal care, no cause of action for:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protected interests in life, health, and well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protected interests in the life,
health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and con-
strued to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development,
all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and resi-
dents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and deci-
sional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court. and specific
provisions to the contrary in the statutes and constitution of this state.
3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" and "unborn child" shall
Webster, Privacy, and RU486
form abortions that are not necessary to save the mother's life,9 and (3) a
requirement that physicians perform viability tests for any fetus believed to
be at least twenty weeks old.'" The Webster decision, however, is significant
beyond the "findings" and regulations themselves. Webster demonstrates
the plurality's deference to state legislation which goes to the procedural
core of the abortion debate. This deference facilitates a transfer from the
federal to the state forum of such questions as: when does life begin, when is
the state's interest in fetal life paramount, and what state actions are consti-
tutional protections of potential human life?1" In this regard, Webster is
include all .unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings from the mo-
ment of conception until birth at every stage of biological development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against a
woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly care for herself
or by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care.
9. Id. at § 188.205. Use of public funds prohibited, when:
It shall be unlawful for any public funds to be expended for the purpose of perform-
ing or assisting an abortion, not necessary to save the life of the mother, or for the
purpose of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion not necessary to
save her life.
§ 188.210. Public employees, activities prohibited, when:
It shall be unlawful for any public employee within the scope of his employment to
perform or assist an abortion, not necessary to save the life of the mother. It shall be
unlawful for a doctor, nurse or other health care personnel, a social worker, a coun-
selor or persons of similar occupation who is a public employee within the scope of
his public employment to encourage or counsel a woman to have an abortion not
necessary to save her life.
10. § 188.029. Physician, determination of viability, duties:
Before a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has reason to believe is
carrying an unborn child of twenty or more weeks gestational age, the physician shall
first determine if the unborn child is viable by using and exercising that degree of
care, skill, and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinary skillful, careful, and
prudent physician engaged in similar practice under the same or similar conditions.
In making this determination of viability, the physician shall perform or cause to be
performed such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of
the gestational age, weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child and shall enter
such findings and determination of viability in the medical record of the mother.
11. The Webster Court's desire to remove abortion regulation from the courts and return
it to the state legislatures is based, in part, on its view that the medical knowledge necessary to
make informed abortion regulation decisions is beyond the capabilities of the courts.
"[L]egislatures, with their superior factfinding capabilities, are certainly better able to make
the necessary judgments than are courts." City of Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 456 n.4 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Medically, the questions arising from the abortion debate can be overwhelmingly intricate.
For example, the question of when life begins. Does life begin at the penetration of the ovum
by a sperm? Does life begin at the cell division of a fertilized ovum to form a blastocyst? Does
life begin at the invasion of the endometrium by the blastocyst? Even assuming that life does
begin at one of these stages, present scientific technology can not accurately detect the exact
moment that one of these events has occurred. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD, & N. GANT,
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 467-68 (17th ed. 1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS]. The in-
1990]
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essentially an invitation to the states to amend their existing abortion laws.
12
By deferring to state abortion legislation, Webster eased the state's burden
in defending the constitutionality of its abortion legislation, placing the
greater burden on the individual challenging the statute's constitutionality.
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists,'3 the ma-
jority applied a strict scrutiny standard of review and invalidated all six pro-
visions of a Pennsylvania statute regulating abortion.' 4 The burden was
placed upon the state to prove that its regulations protected its interest in
maternal health. The state did not prove that the regulations advanced any
legitimate state interest and the statute was declared unconstitutional."
tricacies of the questions involved in abortion regulation may require the time and resources
available to state legislatures.
12. In the recent decision of Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (Tenn. App. Sept. 21, 1988)
(LEXIS, 641), Judge Young cited Webster in his decision to examine state law in deciding the
fate of seven frozen embryos. In Davis, Judge Young declared that life begins at conception
and thus seven frozen embryos at the center of a separation dispute are human beings and not
property. Id. at 30. Judge Young noted that:
the recent Webster case leaves open the door for a state to establish its compelling
interest in protecting even potential human life by legislation declaring its public
policy .... (T]he Webster Court opined that it saw no reason why the state's interest
in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the point of
viability.
Id. at 31. Judge Young then examined Tennessee law to determine its public policy conclud-
ing the "the age-old common law doctrine ofparenspatriae controls these children, in vitro, as
it has always supervised and controlled children . . . in domestic relations cases. Id. at 34.
Because Ms. Davis planned to implant some or all of these embryos, Judge Young awarded
custody to Ms. Davis. It "seems the best interest of these children for Mrs. Davis to be permit-
ted the opportunity to bring these children to term through implantation." Id. at 37.
13. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
14. Abortion Control Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201-3220 (1983). The Pennsylvania
statute required, first, that the woman seeking an abortion be given materials stating that agen-
cies will assist her in carrying her child to term and a.description of the physiological charac-
teristics of an unborn child. The statute also required the woman to be advised of the medical
risks of abortion and childbirth. Id. at §§ 3205, 3208. Second, the physician was required to
record information about the physician performing the abortion and the woman receiving the
abortion which was to be available for public inspection. Id. at § 3214(a),(h). Third, the phy-
sician was required to make and record a non-viability determination for all second and third-
trimester abortions. Id. at § 3211 (a). Fourth, after viability, the physician was required to use
the abortion procedure most likely to preserve the life of the child unless the procedure would
significantly increase the risk to the mother's health. Id. at § 3210(b). Fifth, for abortions
after viability, a second physician must be present to take all reasonable steps to preserve the
life and health of the child. Id. at § 3210(c). All six of these provisions were declared uncon-
stitutional. Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetrics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762-71
(1986).
15. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762-71. The Court found the required informed consent
information to be at times unnecessary and thus at a minimum overinclusive, and at times
facially unconstitutional. Id. at 762-64. The Court disregarded Pennsylvania's reasoning that
the information was necessary for informed consent, finding the information "to be nothing
more than an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion
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In contrast, the Webster Court upheld a state created presumption of via-
bility at twenty weeks - four weeks into the second trimester - which the
physician must rebut before performing an abortion. 6 Using the less strin-
gent rational basis standard of review, this regulation was upheld. 7 The
Court reasoned that the state has a compelling interest in potential human
life, and the state's desire to prevent the mistaken abortion of a viable fetus is
a rational reason for viability testing beginning at twenty weeks. 8 Under
the rational basis standard of review a state's reasoning is rebuttable. How-
ever, after Webster, an individual challenging the constitutionality of state
abortion legislation has the difficult task of demonstrating that there is no
rational way the legislation can further the compelling state interest of pro-
tecting maternal health or potential human life.' 9
into [the doctor-patient relationship]." Id. at 762. With respect to the reporting requirements,
the Court found the scope of the information and the public access to "belie any assertions by
the Commonwealth that it is advancing any legitimate interest" and declared the provision
unconstitutional. Id. at 765-66. Examining the degree of care for the post-viability abortions
provision, the Court did not wait for state court interpretation of the ambiguous phrase "sig-
nificantly greater medical risk," but agreed with the court of appeals that the term required the
mother to bear more than a minimally increased health risk and was thus unconstitutional. Id.
at 769. Finally, in examining the second physician requirement, the Court, again, interpreted
the provision prior to state court interpretation and found it unconstitutional because it did not
provide an exception for emergency maternal health situations. Id. at 770-71. Scrutinizing
Pennsylvania's intentions, the Court concluded that "the Pennsylvania legislature knows how
to provide a medical-emergency exception when it chooses to do so ... [and therefore its]
failure to provide [one] ... was intentional." Id. at 771.
16. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
17. Chief Justice Rehnquist allows this regulation because it "permissibly furthers" the
State interest in potential human life. Id. at 3057. This constitutional test is less than the strict
scrutiny of Thornburgh because it allows the regulation to be overinclusive. Specifically, the
regulation is valid though the required viability tests are likely to be performed on some second
trimester abortions. Id.
Justice O'Connor allows the testing requirement because it "does not impose an undue bur-
den on a woman's abortion decision." Id. at 3063. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (prior to a state statute creating an "undue burden," judicial scru-
tiny "should be limited to whether the state law bears a rational relationship to legitimate
purposes such as the advancement of" maternal health and potential human life.)
18. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3055. Chief Justice Rehnquist notes that the district court found
that a 20 week fetus is not viable and only at 23 1/2 to 24 weeks is there a reasonable possibil-
ity of viability. But, the district court found that there may be a four week error in estimating
gestational age. Therefore, to protect every viable fetus against an abortion due to miscalcu-
lated gestational age, testing should begin at 20 weeks. Id.
Interestingly, in many states, a birth certificate is prepared for any pregnancy at 20 weeks or
older. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 11, at 467.
19. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1446-50 (2d ed. 1988). Examining
the effect of the rational basis standard of review on the Equal Protection Clause, Tribe notes
that "underinclusive" and "overinclusive" legislation is permissible "[b]ecause the problems of
government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require rough accommodations, a
demand for mathematical nicety is implausible: instead, the Constitution invalidates only that
1990]
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The plurality also went to great lengths to avoid considering the constitu-
tionality of the preamble, stating that "ft]he preamble can be read simply to
express [a] sort of value judgment" 20 and not as a limit on abortion. It is
within the province of the state courts first to decide if the preamble imper-
missibly limits a woman's abortion right.2 '
The Webster plurality has, in theory, allowed the states to enact more
extensive restrictions on a woman's right to abortion. Yet, the statute at
issue in Webster only chips away at the edges of Roe. Abortion still may be
prohibited only after viability, with viability moved back four weeks into the
second trimester.22 Despite the four week violation of the strict trimester
framework of Roe, the plurality chose to distinguish and narrow Roe rather
than overturn it.23 Therefore, the question arises as to whether state legisla-
tion that results in severe restrictions of first and early second-trimester
abortions - abortions that could be performed with RU486 on an outpa-
tient basis - will be constitutional. An examination of both the plurality's
view of the right to privacy and Roe's trimester framework will prove
instructive.
III. PRIVACY AND ABORTION LAW
The present Court takes a more literal approach toward the Constitution,
viewing its role as a corrector of legislative excess and not a creator of indi-
vidual rights. Through legislative activity, the states themselves create or
protect the rights not expressly contained within the Constitution, not the
courts. To read beyond the text of the Constitution is to allow the Court to
remove the people's authority to govern themselves, a form of tyranny.2 4
governmental choice which is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment." Id. at 1446 (citations omitted).
20. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3050.
21. Id. By abstaining, the majority may add additional expense, delay, and inconvenience
to individual plaintiffs whose appeals will likely reach the Court anyway.
22. The Roe Court chose "viability" as the point where the state may regulate and even
proscribe abortions with only an exception for maternal health. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
164-65 (1973). The Roe Court determined that viability occurs at 24 weeks, the beginning of
the third-trimester. Id. at 160. Similarly, Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.030 (1986) chose "viability"
as the point where it may proscribe abortion with only a maternal health exception. But the
required viability determination at 20 weeks of § 188.029 "creates what is essentially a pre-
sumption of viability at 20 weeks." Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3055. Thus, viability remains the
point where the state may proscribe abortion with only a maternal health exception, except the
Missouri legislature has determined that viability begins four weeks earlier than the Supreme
Court did in Roe.
23. Only Justice Scalia called for Roe to be overturned. See infra note 35.
24. See Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetrics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-87
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
In my view, [the rejection of Roe Y. Wade] would be highly desirable from the stand-
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At the heart of the abortion debate is the tension between state police
powers25 and the unwritten right to privacy.2 6 Judging from the C6urt's
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,27 the Court implies that past privacy rights
decisions have merely reflected the personal values of the Justices which
have been imposed upon the states without Constitutional root.28 Therefore,
to ensure that privacy rights do not arise from judicial whim, privacy issues
should be scrutinized, and the question asked whether "the federal Constitu-
tion confers a right to engage in this activity?"29 In doing so, the Court
point of the Constitution. Abortion is a hotly contested moral and political issue.
Such issues, in our society, are to be resolved by the will of the people, either as
expressed through legislation or through the general principles they have already
incorporated into the Constitution they have adopted. Roe v. Wade implies that the
people have already resolved the debate by weaving into the Constitution the values
and principles that answer the issue. As I have argued, I believe it is clear that the
people have never - not in 1787, 1791, 1868, or at any time since - done any such
thing. I would return the issue to the people by overruling Roe v. Wade.
Id. at 796-97.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Webster plurality echoes the sentiments of Justice
White when he states:
The goal of the constitutional adjudication is surely not to remove inexorably 'politi-
cally divisive' issues from the ambit of the legislative process, whereby the people
through their elected representatives deal with matters of concern to them. The goal
of constitutional adjudication is to hold true the balance between that which the
Constitution puts beyond the reach of the democratic process and that which it does
not. We think we have done that today.
Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3058.
The Webster majority's views on judicial restraint and state's rights are not limited to abor-
tion. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989).
In DeShaney, the Court ruled that a governmental agency was not liable for injuries inflicted
upon a minor by his father despite repeated notifications of these injuries to the agency and an
agency investigation noting probable child abuse. More importantly for this Comment, the
dicta of the majority (Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and recently appointed Kennedy, JJ., joined) outlined its view of
the doctrine of state's rights and the role of the judiciary.
The people of Wisconsin may well prefer a system of liability which would place
upon the State and its officials the responsibility for failure to act in situations as the
present one. They may create such a system, if they do not have it already, by chang-
ing the tort law of the State in accordance with the regular law-making process. But
they should not have it thrust upon them by this Court's expansion of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 1007.
25. See supra note 6.
26. Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) states that a right to privacy exists
within the "penumbras" of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.
27. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing
sodomy against the challenge that the statute violates an active homosexual's right to privacy.
28. Id. at 191.
29. The Supreme Court formulated the issue of the case as "whether the Federal Consti-
tution confers a right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Id. at 190.
1990]
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limits its ability to employ present knowledge in interpreting Constitutional
rights. In Bowers, the Court looked to specific liberties that are "deeply
rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." " Rights, like homosexual rights at issue in Bowers, which
are not enumerated in the Constitution, historically accepted as fundamen-
tal, or basic to the workings of society, must be statutorily conferred on
citizens today.
3 1
Applying this reasoning to abortion,32 the majority has been extremely
critical of the "unwritten" 3 3 trimester guidelines of Roe. As members of the
minorities of Akron and Thornburgh, Justices O'Connor and White criti-
cized the unworkability of Roe's rigid trimester framework, with Justice
White calling for Roe to be overturned. 34 However, when the minority be-
30. Id. at 192. After examining sodomy statutes, the majority of which were passed in the
18th and 19th centuries, Id. at 192 n.5, 193 n.6, and ancient Roman and Judaeo-Christian
moral standards, Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring), the majority determined that homo-
sexual sodomy has never been accepted as a fundamental right and therefore not within the
contemplation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 194.
31. The dissent of Justice Blackmun, Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Ste-
vens disagrees arguing that this is not a case about a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy
as it is a case about the right of an individual to make certain decisions beyond the reach of
government. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has long recognized
"that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty
will be kept largely beyond the reach of government." Id. at 203. An individual's privacy
interest encompasses those decisions that "form a central part of an individual's life." Id. at
204. Sexual intimacy "is a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to the devel-
opment of the human personality." Id. at 205. In this diverse Nation, decisions about sexual
intimacy which do not harm others should be protected from government intrusion regardless'
of whether the decisions conform to the views of the majority of the citizenry. Id. at 205, 210-
12. Homosexual sodomy between two consenting adults should not be criminalized because of
the views of this majority or the dictates of history, but protected from governmental interfer-
ence. There are many "right" ways to conduct intimate associations, all of which should be
constitutional because sexuality is central to an individual's self-identity and thus can only be
made by the individual without limitations imposed by government. Id. at 205-06.
32. See Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetrics & Gynecology, 476 U.S. 747, 790-91
(1986) (White, J., dissenting). Unwritten fundamental rights within the Due Process Clause
are those which are either "in the traditions and consensus of our society as a whole or in the
logical implications of a system that recognizes both individual liberty and democratic order."
Id. at 791. Examining abortion, Justice White concluded that the Roe decision itself (probably
Roe's invalidation of numerous state criminal abortion statutes. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139-40
nn.34-37) and the continuing and deep division over abortion today demonstrate that there is
no "deeply rooted" abortion right in the "Nation's history and tradition." Thus, the abortion
right is not an unwritten fundamental right within the Due Process Clause. Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 791 (White, J., dissenting).
33. The author notes that the trimester guidelines are written in Roe, but they are not
found in the literal text of the Constitution.
34. In her Akron dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for its denial of any
state interest prior to the compelling point. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 459 (1983). A state's interest in maternal health and fetal life are compel-
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came the Webster plurality, only Justice Scalia called for Roe to be over-
turned." The remainder of the plurality resolved the conflicts in Webster by
narrowing and distinguishing Roe.36 In fact, the plurality of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Kennedy acknowledged that abortion
is "a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."37 In the end,
without overruling Roe, the plurality replaced Roe's strict scrutiny test with
the combined rational basis analysis of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor - restrictions on early abortions are constitutional if they "per-
missibly further the State's interest in protecting potential human life" with-
out imposing "an undue burden on a woman's abortion decision.",
3 8
Constitutional state abortion legislation will now turn on the Court's in-
terpretation of the terms "compelling state interest" and "undue burden."39
ling throughout pregnancy because fetal life, for example, is no less potential during the early
weeks of pregnancy than it is from viability onwards. Id. at 460-61. In Thornburgh, Justice
White declares that "[tIhe State's interest is in the fetus as an entity in itself ... [a]ccordingly,
the State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability." Thorn-
burgh, 476 U.S. at 795 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, Roe's trimester framework is medically
flawed (and not ground in Constitutional root) and should be overturned. Id. at 796.
35. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3065-66 (1989). Justice
Scalia gives three reasons to overturn Roe. First, to restrict Webster so narrowly preserves the
present abortion law "chaos." Id. Second, this narrow decision maintains a public mispercep-
tion that the Court decides political issues. Id. Third, given the arguable evil of abortion, if
states have the constitutional power to prohibit abortion, the Court should tell them so. Id.
36. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White and Justice Kennedy, distinguished
Roe by noting that the statute at issue in Webster prohibited abortions only after viability while
the statute at issue in Roe criminalized all abortions. Id. at 3058. Justice O'Connor found no
conflicts with Roe. Once § 188.029 was properly interpreted as requiring viability tests only
when they are safe and necessary within the doctor's discretion, it does not conflict with Roe.
Since the statute's constitutionality does not turn on Roe's constitutionality, there is no reason
to re-examine Roe. Id. at 3060.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 3063.
39. The Supreme Court granted review in three more cases involving abortion and per-
missible state regulation. The Court will review the conflicting court of appeals decisions in
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 57
U.S.L.W. 3851 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1989) (No. 92-212), and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452
(8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3852 (U.S. Jun. 27, 1989) (No. 88-1125). In Slaby,
an Ohio statute (amended substitute House Bill No. 319 to have been enacted under OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.85 and 2919.12) (Anderson Supp. 1985) required either advance 24-
hour notice to parents or the satisfaction of a juvenile court bypass option before an unemanci-
pated minor could receive an abortion. The judicial bypass option under this Ohio statute is a
complex procedure where the minor must prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence
that she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision without notification to her parents
or that parental notification would be contrary to her best interest. The Sixth Circuit held this
to be an unconstitutional burden on the minor's right to an abortion. Slaby, 854 F.2d at 873
(case in which the court ruled for summary dismissal of Akron Center for Reproductive
Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ohio 1986)). The State did not meet its burden of
proof that this procedure helped ensure a well informed medical decision. Rosen, 633 F. Supp.
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If "compelling state interest" is interpreted in its usual constitutional sense,
it will probably outweigh a woman's "liberty interest" or even "fundamental
right" to an abortion." Then, a state could constitutionally enact severe
restrictions on early abortion to protect its compelling interest in potential
human life which exists throughout pregnancy. If, however, "compelling
state interest" is interpreted in its definitional sense, the state interest may
demand great weight in the balance between a woman's privacy rights and a
state's right to protect its unborn citizens, but it should not prevail
absolutely.4
"Undue burden" is also left undefined.42 The life of the mother has his-
torically outweighed the potential life of the fetus, but the question remains
at 1135. Further, regulation limited the grounds upon which a court could find notification
necessary. Id. at 1135-37. This, combined with the somewhat restrictive clear and convincing
standard, risked an improper deprivation of a minor's right to an abortion. Id.
However, a similar statute was upheld in Hodgson v. Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit held
that a two parent notification scheme with a judicial bypass option, which requires the minor
to prove either maturity or that an abortion without parental notification is in her best interest,
was constitutional. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.343(2)-(7) (West 1987). Reviewing the statute
as a whole, the Court noted the potential consequences of an abortion and found valid state
interests in ensuring a wise decision. Hodgson, 853 F.2d at 1465. Further, the parental notifi-
cation provision promoted the traditional state interest in the family as well as providing an
opportunity for the parents to supply necessary medical information. Id, at 1463-65. Because
these interests are compelling, the statute did not violate a minor's abortion right. Id. at 1465.
Finally, in Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W.
3851 (U.S. Jun. 27, 1989) (No. 88-790), the Supreme Court will review, among other issues,
whether Illinois can constitutionally license and regulate outpatient surgical facilities in which
pregnancy terminations are performed to the same extent that it licenses and regulates outpa-
tient surgical facilities in which pregnancy terminations are not performed. Id.
40. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 696 (3d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] ("where the [state] legislation restricts the exercise of
fundamental constitutional rights it will only be upheld if it is necessary to promote a compel-
ling state interest"). In the reverse, if a compelling state interest exists, it will be upheld
though it restricts the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right. In the abortion arena, the
saving of an unborn life is a compelling state interest which should be upheld although it
restricts a woman's right to privacy.
41. Justice O'Connor's dissent in Akron suggests that she may be using "compelling" in
its non-constitutional sense. Concluding a section outlining her reasons for recognizing state
interest in potential fetal life prior to viability, Justice O'Connor states that "[the Roe] frame-
work is clearly an unworkable means of balancing the fundamental [abortion] right and the
compelling state interest." City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416, 459 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Nowhere in the preceding passage does Justice
O'Connor state or suggest that the compelling state interest is absolute. Further, the balancing
of state and maternal interests is necessary to protect maternal health. Without at least a
minimal balancing of interests, the state could ban abortions even when the pregnancy would
directly threaten the woman's life.
42. In Akron, Justice O'Connor states only general descriptions of what an "undue bur-
den" entails, namely, "absolute obstacle," "coercive restraint," "official interference," or "state
action drastically limiting the availability and safety [of abortion]." Akron, 462 U.S. at 464
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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open as to when the mother's burden is less than life itself.4 3 Furthermore,
the life potential of a fetus varies throughout pregnancy depending on the
fetus' weight and gestational age - a possible factor to be weighed in deter-
mining the relative "burden" imposed on a woman by a state restriction on
early abortion."
Presented with a state statute restricting early abortion, the Webster plu-
rality, in applying a rational basis analysis, could balance the state's compel-
ling interest and the woman's burden in favor of the woman and declare the
statute unconstitutional. However, the plurality's deference to state legisla-
tion would likely allow a well-written state statute to interpret the ambigui-
ties of "compelling state interest" and "undue burden" in favor of the state.
Into this foray comes RU486, the new abortion pill, which does not require
professional assistance to induce an abortion, but may present medical con-
sequences. Use of the drug will undoubtedly precipitate state regulation and
court challenges.
IV. RU486
RU486 is an antiprogesterone.4 5 Progesterone is the hormone that
prepares the uterus for implantation and retention of the fertilized egg.
4 6
Although not completely certain, researchers believe that RU486 blocks
43. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 40, at 697 ("It should be noted that all of the
[abortion] opinions have assumed that an exception would be made to [post-viability prohibi-
tions] to secure the mother's life or prevent serious injury to her health"). But see Thornburgh
v. Am. College of Obstetrics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 744, 808-10 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting):
[I]f, as the Court has held, the State has a compelling interest in the preservation of
the life of a viable fetus, I find the majority's unwillingness to tolerate the imposition
of any non-negligible risk of injury to a pregnant woman in order to protect the life of
her viable fetus in the course of an abortion baffling.
Id. at 809.
44. The spontaneous abortion rate in early pregnancy is approximately 60% while the
overall rate throughout pregnancy is approximately 10%. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note
11, at 467-68. The mortality rate of infants even with intensive care is virtually 100% for
infants weighing less than 600g (approximately 23 weeks) decreasing to about 40% for infants
between 900 and 999g. Equally telling, among the survivors, severe handicaps was 100% in
the 600 to 699g weight group, 26% for the 700 to 799g group, 29% for the 800 to 899g group,
and 3% for the 900 to 999g group. Id. at 748-50.
45. Roger & Baird, Induction of Therapeutic Abortion in Early Pregnancy with Mifepris-
tone in Combination with Prostaglandin Pessary, LANCET, Dec. 19, 1987, at 1415 [hereinafter
LANCET].
46. Cameron & Baird, Early Pregnancy Termination: A Comparison Between Vacuum As-
piration and Medical Abortion Using Prostaglandin or the Anti-progestogen R U486, 95 BRIT. J.
OBST. & GYN. 271-72 (1988) [hereinafter BRIT. J.].
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progesterone thus causing the lining of the uterus to break down and bleed.47
The uterus then secretes prostaglandin, a hormone which induces muscle
contractions expelling the embryo or fetus.48 The uterus needs to be de-
prived of progesterone for only a few hours to initiate this process. Taken as
a pill, RU486 ideally simulates a miscarriage which occurs in approximately
a week.49 Studies of RU486 are compelling both for their conclusions and
for their exclusions. This comment will summarize and compare three re-
cent studies.50
Dr. Baulieu and four associates studied the effects of RU486 on 100 wo-
men with early, unwanted pregnancies. 5  The women were between the ages
of 19 and 42, with normal pregnancies of 5 1/2 to 6 weeks and sound medi-
cal histories.52 The women were divided into three test groups and given
various doses of RU486 over a four day period. Follow-up visits were sched-
uled for days 4, 6, 9, and 13 after RU486 ingestion with a tentative appoint-
ment for vacuum aspiration53 set for day thirteen in case of failed abortion.
Overall, RU486 induced eighty-five complete abortions,54 and fifteen incom-
plete abortions.55 The reason for these fifteen incomplete abortions is
unknown.
56
The most dangerous side effect of RU486 was prolonged, heavy bleeding
(18%), but women also experienced slight nausea (24%), fatigue (22%), and
47. Couzinet, Termination of Early Pregnancy by the Progesterone Antagonist RU486
(Mifepristone), 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1565, 1568 (1986) [hereinafter NEW ENG. J.].
48. BRIT. J., supra note 46, at 271.
49. Herman, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1988, at 13 (Health), col. 1.
50. These three studies were selected because the author believes that they accurately
reflect the current medical knowledge available on RU486. For another recent study and cita-
tions to several previous studies see Grimes, Early Abortion With a Single Dose of the An-
tiprogestin RU-486, 158 AM. J. OBST. GYN. 1307 (1988). The results of this study support the
conclusions reached in the three studies outlined in this Comment.
51. NEW ENG. J., supra note 47, at 1565-70.
52. "We recruited 120 healthy women within ten days of the expected onset of the missed
menses from among persons applying for a legal abortion. The women were 19 to 40 years old
and had a history of regular menses (28 +/- 4 days). Women with any symptoms of an
abnormal pregnancy or pelvic inflammatory disease; a history of use of glucocortoids in the
previous three months; or a history of liver, gastrointestinal or renal disease were excluded
from the study." NEW ENG. J., supra note 47, at 1565.
53. Vacuum aspiration is an abortion procedure in which a tube is inserted into the uterus
which vacuums away the lining of the uterus and with it the fetus. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS,
supra note 11, at 479-81.
54. A complete abortion is one where the fetus is dead and expelled from the body. NEW
ENG. J., supra note 47, at 1566.
55. An incomplete abortion is one where the fetus is dead but not expelled from the body.
Id.
56. Id. There are no differences in age, date of pregnancy, or previous history of preg-
nancy in those who aborted and those who did not. In addition, the failure rate was also the
same at all three dosage levels. Id. at 1568-69.
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painful contractions (20%)." None of the side-effects proved to be serious
and RU486 was generally well tolerated.58 This study concluded that
RU486 is safe and effective but only in "very early pregnancy" and "only
under close medical supervision." 9
A similar study was later conducted by Dr. Mary M. Rogers and Dr.
David T. Baird.' This study differed from Dr. Baulieu's study in that along
with RU486, a gemeprost vaginal pessary61 was given to enhance expulsion.
The test group was similar: one hundred women between the ages of 17 and
40 who had normal pregnancies of less than eight weeks and sound medical
histories.62 Various doses of RU486 were given in one day with a gemeprost
vaginal pessary given two days later. Follow-up examinations were sched-
uled for weeks 1, 2, and 4 after RU486 ingestion. RU486 produced ninety-
five complete abortions and five incomplete abortions.63 The five incomplete
abortions required either curettage" or the removal by other methods of the
"products of conception" at times ranging from 2 1/2 to 7 1/2 weeks after
ingestion of RU486.65 No serious complications were reported during treat-
ment, but nausea occurred in over half of the patients, ten percent had diar-
rhea or a high degree of pain, and bleeding ranged from 4 to 43 days with a
median of twelve days. 66 Drs. Rogers and Baird concluded that the "occur-
57. Id. at 1566-67. But see Ulmann, The Antiprogestins: A Recent Advance in Fertility
Regulation, 27 J. STEROID BIOCHEM. 1009, 1011 (1987). "Mild abdominal pain, nausea/
vomiting or tiredness have sometimes been reported when using RU486... but careful analy-
sis of available data suggests that these symptoms are related more to pregnancy interruption
than to RU486 itself." Id.
58. Id. at 1569. One should compare the side effects of RU486 with the dangers of surgi-
cal abortion which include the risks of anesthesia, surgical complications, infertility, and psy-
chological after effects. Id.
59. Id. In this study, "close medical supervision" included having a professional staff
member always available for emergencies, the use of vacuum aspiration for failed abortions,
and a follow-up visit a month after a complete abortion. Id. at 1566.
60. LANCET, supra note 45, at 1415-18.
61. A gemeprost vaginal pessary is a vaginal suppository used to aid expulsion of the
fetus. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1689 (1967).
62. "Women with evidence of multiple pregnancy or spontaneous abortion were excluded
from the study as were those with a history of serious medical disorder and those aged below
17." LANCET, supra note 45, at 1415.
63. Id. The addition of a small dose of prostaglandin to treatment with RU486 increased
the frequency of abortion from 85% as demonstrated in NEW ENG. J., supra note 47, and 60%
as demonstrated in BRIT. J., supra note 46, to 95% as demonstrated in the present study.
64. Curettage is the removal of the fetus by a scraping away of the uterine lining. WIL-
LIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 11, at 479.
65. LANCET, supra note 45, at 1415-16.
66. Id. at 1416-17. Only nine patients required intramuscular pain killers, but over half
were administered some pain killing drugs. Further, the blood-loss experienced was similar to
that of a heavy period. Id. at 1417. As stated in note 57, supra, it is difficult to assess where
complications due to pregnancy termination end and complications due to RU486 begin.
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rence of incomplete abortion after medical termination of pregnancy ...
makes careful follow-up a necessity."
67
Lastly, Dr. Baird teamed with Dr. I.T. Cameron to compare the widely
used vacuum aspiration method with the use of RU486 alone and RU486
with a gemeprost vaginal pessary. 68 As in the two previous studies, the wo-
men were in early pregnancy, healthy, and between the ages of 17 and 41.69
RU486 was administered to the patients over four days with one group re-
ceiving the gemeprost on day three after RU486 ingestion. 70 Follow-up ex-
aminations were scheduled after weeks 1 and 2 with more examinations
every two weeks until the next menstruation.7' Complete abortions oc-
curred in ninety-six percent of those using vacuum aspiration, in ninety-five
percent of those given RU486 and gemeprost, and in only sixty percent of
those given RU486 alone.72 The women who ingested RU486 remained hos-
pitalized throughout the treatment.73
While the majority of the women studied had no serious complications,
one woman had an emergency uterine evacuation due to heavy bleeding after
RU486 alone failed to produce a complete abortion, and one woman had to
be removed from the study due to RU486 produced side effects.74 Noting
that this method of abortion must be acceptable to both the woman seeking
the abortion and the health care provider to be effective, 75 Drs. Baird and
Cameron concluded that RU486 with or without a gemeprost vaginal
pessary "must be administered under close medical supervision" to detect
67. Id. at 1417-18. Interestingly, despite the admonition that careful follow-up is a "ne-
cessity," the authors state that RU486 and prostaglandin abortions should "have particular
application in the countries where skilled medical and surgical experience are in short supply."
Id. at 1418.
68. BRIT. J., supra note 46, at 271-76. The study also included abortions by using a vagi-
nal pessary of a prostaglandin analogue alone, but I have not included these results since they
do not involve RU486 or its comparison to the common procedure of vacuum aspiration.
69. "Patients with evidence of abnormal pregnancy or spontaneous abortion were ex-
cluded from the study, as were women with medical complications such as cardiovascular or
pulmonary disease, allergy, or epilepsy." Id. at 272.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 272-73.
72. Id. at 273-74.
73. Id. at 272. In contrast, the women who aborted by vacuum aspiration were treated on
an outpatient basis. Id.
74. Id. at 274. The specific side effects were not named.
75. Id. at 274-75. Comparing the risks of abortion by vacuum aspiration to those of medi-
cal treatment involving RU486, it should be noted that in this study vacuum aspiration was
completed in one visit to the doctor on an outpatient basis while RU486 abortions occurred
over a four day period of hospitalization. Id. at 272. Presently, French family planning cen-
ters administer RU486 on an outpatient basis. Herman, The Politics of the Abortion Pill,
Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1989, at 12 (Health), col. 4.
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"treatment failures," to diagnose "ectopic pregnancy," 76 and "also to assess
their [RU486 and gemeprost] effects in delaying subsequent ovulation, which
may offer a major restraint to the use of these medical agents on a regular
basis for fertility control.",
77
All three of these studies noted the potential benefits of RU486 as a safe
and effective abortion procedure when used correctly. Psychologically,
many believe RU486 makes for a less stressful abortion decision because
women will be able to obtain it from their physician and use it at home.78
Physically, RU486 is usually experienced like "an abundant painless men-
strual period" 79 that "avoids the risks of perforation and scarring" to the
uterus80 as well as the risks of surgical and anaesthetical complications asso-
ciated with mechanical abortions.8 1  RU486 is also less expensive than
mechanical abortions.8 2
Despite its potential benefits, RU486 has many potentially serious side
effects. Nearly every woman who has taken RU486 experienced prolonged
menstrual-like bleeding lasting anywhere from a few days to a few weeks.8 3
76. An ectopic pregnancy is one occurring elsewhere than in the cavity of the uterus.
WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 721 (1967).
77. A 1987 article in the Journal of Steroid Biochemistry, supra note 56, at 1011, states
that data obtained from more than 1000 women suggests that a limited number of properly
administered treatments of RU486 will not impair future fertility, though it may cause a slight
delay in ovulation in some women. However, researchers are unsure what permanent effects
RU486 will have on a woman's menstrual cycle if it is regularly used as a once-a-month birth
control pill. Franklin, Drugs: Brave New Pill, HIPPOCRATES 24 (May, 1987) [hereinafter Brave
New Pill].
78. French Abortion Pill 90% Effective, MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, Oct. 12, 1987, at 82
[hereinafter MEDICAL WORLD NEWS]. However, "RU486 is not a do-it-yourself substitute
for vacuum aspiration." Id. A doctor-patient relationship is necessary to prevent administra-
tion to patients whose medical conditions or histories put them at an unacceptable risk of
complication, see, e.g., supra note 52, which may not be known to the lay patient; to assist in
emergency situations associated with RU486 and pregnancy termination in general, see, e.g.,
supra note 59; and to ensure that the pregnancy is terminated and the fetal remains expelled,
see MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, at 82.
79. NEW ENG. J., supra note 47, at 1566.
80. MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, supra note 78, at 82.
81. NEW ENG. J., supra note 47, at 1569. Despite the potential complications of mechani-
cal abortions, the complete abortion success rate is nearly 100%. BRIT. J., supra note 46, at
273 (100% success rate with 28 women receiving vacuum aspiration abortions with no blood
transfusions or overnight observation required); Grimes, Early Abortion with a Single Dose of
the Antiprogestin RU486, 158 AM. J. OBST. GYN. 1307, 1310 (1988) (the success rate of suc-
tion curettage is 99%).
82. MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, supra note 78. This may afford additional access to abor-
tion for the impoverished which would not otherwise be available due to allowable prohibitions
of state aid for abortion after Webster.
83. Brave New Pill, supra note 77, at 22-23. See LANCET, supra note 45, at 1416, Table III
(average duration of bleeding was 12 days with the range from 4 to 43); BRIT. J., supra note 46,
at 274 (average duration of bleeding was 11 days with the range from 5 to 34 days for patients
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This bleeding occurred whether the fetus was expelled completely or
whether unexpelled tissue remained in the uterus.84 Further, this unexpelled
tissue could lead to serious infections.85 Only a doctor's examination will
ensure that all of the fetal tissue has been expelled and the abortion com-
plete.86 An incomplete abortion could be fatal.87
RU486 is potentially hazardous when not used within strict, doctor super-
vised guidelines 88 because RU486 is not completely understood. 89 Women
with less than ideal pregnancies or medical histories, as well as very young
women, were excluded from these studies, implying potential complications
for these groups.9  Scientists are also unsure of the efficacy of RU486 after 8
weeks of pregnancy. 91 If RU486 is taken on a monthly basis as an emer-
gency contraceptive backup, its currently tested dosage could seriously dis-
rupt the regularity of the woman's menstrual cycle.92 Moreover, a woman
who chooses to use the drug should be certain that she wants an abortion
because if the abortion is incomplete, RU486 could have damaged the
fetus.
93
V. RU486, ABORTION LAW, AND A MODEL STATUTE
Given the regulatory deference afforded the states following Webster, the
issue is whether the states will be able to constitutionally regulate RU486
and restrict a woman's right to abortion by expanding state protection of
treated with RU486 alone or RU486 and a gemeprost pessary); NEW ENG. J., supra note 47, at
1566 (average duration of bleeding was 11.6 days with the range from 5 to 17 days).
84. Brave New Pill, supra note 77, at 24.
85. Id.
86. Id. See also MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, supra note 78, at 82.
87. Brave New Pill, supra note 77, at 24.
88. Id.
89. "The mechanism by which RU486 interrupts pregnancy is not clear ... [and] [t]he
reason why an abortion did not occur in these patients [with incomplete abortions] is un-
known." NEW ENG. J., supra note 47, at 1568.
90. BRIT. J., supra note 46, at 272; LANCET, supra note 45, at 1415-16; NEW ENG. J.,
supra note 47, at 1565. Further, medical studies of the nature conducted with RU486 are often
conducted exclusive of minorities and persons with alternate lifestyles, i.e., drug abusers, bisex-
uals, etc. Therefore, the effects of variations in dietary, drug, and sexual habits of the public at
large are not fully known. See, e.g., Rogers, Federal Spending on AIDS - How Much is
Enough?, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1623 (1988) (effect of excluding minorities and persons with
alternate lifestyles from AIDS trials).
91. Success With Abortion Drug Reported, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1986, at A19, col. 1. Fur-
ther, "[t]he average hemorrhage complication rate is 2.3% and usually is associated with
pregnancies of more than seven weeks." MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, supra note 78, at 82.
92. Brave New Pill, supra note 77, at 24.
93. Id. Aside from potential state regulation, the fear of product liability litigation and
pro-life boycotts may deter drug companies from marketing RU486 in the United States. See
MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, supra note 78, at 82.
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maternal health and potential human life. The possibility exists. 94
Current medical knowledge states that, first, RU486 should be used only
within the first 8 weeks of pregnancy; second, by women with normal
pregnancies and medical histories; and third, only under medical supervi-
sion. With these precautions, RU486 abortions are generally safe and effec-
tive. Outside of these precautions, however, the use of RU486 can be
hazardous to the mother and the fetus. Furthermore, because RU486 is self-
administered and does not require medical assistance or supervision people
may have a tendency to misuse or abuse the drug.
With the Webster Court's deference to state "findings" and its belief in
compelling state interests in potential human life and maternal health
throughout pregnancy, 95 a statute able to be interpreted as one which "per-
missibly furthers" state interests in maternal health and potential human life
is likely to be upheld. Even an abortion restriction that extends into the first
trimester might be upheld.96 The Court was openly hostile to Roe, though it
did not overrule it. Therefore, given the dicta of Webster, the Court may
continue to limit Roe or possibly even overturn it to uphold a well-written
statutory protection of maternal health and potential human life.
Any legislation on this subject should contain certain basic elements.
First, the statute should list relevant "findings" on RU486. Because the
state's purpose is to protect maternal health and potential human life
through restriction of the use of RU486, the medical risks of RU486 should
be mentioned, including the potential risk of fetal damage caused by the
improper use of RU486, especially after the eighth week of pregnancy. Sec-
ondly, based on the aforementioned legislative "findings," the statute should
prohibit the use of RU486 after the eighth week of pregnancy. A provision
94. See, e.g., Louisiana Lawyers Move to Revive Invalidated Law Banning Abortion, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 7, 1989, § 1, at 9, col. 1; Anti-abortion Legislation Proposed in Pennsylvania, Wash.
Post, Oct. 4, 1989, at A2 col. 1.
However, political responsibility after Webster may cause state legislatures to relax or at
least retain present abortion statutes rather than pass more restrictive legislation. See, e.g., In
Florida, Abortion Activists Take the Stage; state senate panel quickly defeats governor's proposed
restrictions, Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 3; Abortion's Changing Politics Keys House
Turnaround: 206-216 rejection of restrictions on D.C. funding is first setback for abortion foes
since 1980, 47 Cong. Q. 2020 (Aug. 5, 1989); Limits on Abortion Seem Less Likely, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1989, at A l, col. 1. Further, state constitutions may prevent state legislatures
from passing more restrictive abortion statutes. See, e.g., Florida Court Rules Against Abortion
Curbs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989, at A15, col. 1 (Florida Supreme Court invalidates abortion
statute mandating parental consent as a violation of the Florida Constitution).
95. See supra note 3.
96. Roe holds that there are no compelling state interests greater than the mother's right
to an abortion during the first trimester. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-63 (1973). But
Webster recognizes a compelling state interest in protecting human life throughout pregnancy.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
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could be added requiring the doctor, in his or her professional discretion, to
perform the tests necessary to determine if the pregnancy is eight weeks or
older, and to record his or her findings and determination in the mother's
medical record. Thirdly, to further protect maternal health and potential
human life, RU486 should be required to be administered at a medical facil-
ity under the supervision of a doctor or nurse. Finally, the statute should
contain a disclaimer provision stating that this statute is not intended to
restrict the performance of abortions necessary to preserve the mother's life
or health, or the use of RU486 in non-abortion medical treatments.
97
Combining the above suggestions, a model statute regulating RU486 may
be written as follows:
I. Findings on RU486
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) RU486, when administered to terminate a pregnancy, poses
significant dangers to maternal health when ingested:
(A) after the eighth week of pregnancy; or
(B) by a woman with any medical complications or history of
medical complications, including but not limited to ectopic or
multiple pregnancy; liver, gastro-intestinal, renal, cardiovas-
cular, or pulmonary disease; allergy; or epilepsy; or
(C) by a woman less than seventeen years of age; or
(D) continuously at intervals of one month or less.
2. RU486, when used to terminate a pregnancy, poses a significant
danger of disability to the fetus when ingested after the eighth
week of pregnancy.
II. Physician, determination of gestational age, duties
Before a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has reason
to believe is carrying an unborn child of more than eight weeks gesta-
tional age, the physician shall first determine if the unborn child is
more than eight week gestational age by using the degree of care,
skill, and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinary skillful,
careful, and prudent physician engaged in similar practice under the
-same or similar conditions. In making this determination the physi-
cian shall perform or cause to be performed such examinations and
tests as are necessary to make a finding of gestational age, and shall
97. Studies indicate that RU486 can be used to treat Cushing's syndrome, Nieman, Suc-
cessful Treatment of Cushing's Syndrome with the Gluccortoid Antagonist R U486, 61 J. CLIN.
ENDOCRINOL. METAB. 536 (1985), and tumor cells including breast cancer, Bakker, Setyono-
Han, Portengen, De Jong, Foekens, & Klijn, Endocrine and Antitumor Effects of Combined
Treatment with an Antiprogestin and Antestrogen or Luteinizing Hormone-Releasing Hormone
Agonist in Female Rats Mammary Tumors, 125 ENDOCRINOLOGY 1593 (1989).
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enter such findings and determination of gestational age in the medi-
cal record of the mother.
III. RU486 prohibition, medical administration
1. No abortion using RU486 shall be performed after the eighth
week of pregnancy.
2. RU486, when administered to terminate a pregnancy within the
first eight weeks of pregnancy, shall be administered only by a
licensed doctor or nurse of this state, and only in a licensed clinic
or hospital.
IV. Protection of maternal life, health
Nothing in this statute shall be interpreted as a restriction on
abortion necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother or the
use of RU486 in non-abortion medical treatments.
VI. CONCLUSION
The model state statute above is possible only because the Supreme
Court's minority became a majority. With the appointments of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, the balance in the Court
shifted from individual conduct to state regulation, from judicial supervision
of state statutes to judicial restraint. There has also been a shift toward the
principle of federal non-interference in state legislative pronouncements.
Surely when a state exercises its legislative will in a matter concerning the
health and safety of its citizens, the Constitution is not likely to constrain
state legislation unless that constitutional principle is clear and to the point.
Roe is suspect because it relies upon privacy and lacks explicitness. Thus,
inviting attack by the Webster Court, Roe's weaknesses are further exacer-
bated because it affects health and safety, which are state concerns.
It can be argued that Webster's greatest impact is on minorities and the
poor, because it limits access to abortion. Reductions in state aid and state
legislated prohibitions on abortion will inject out-of-state travel, money con-
straints, and politics into a woman's abortion decision. What will amount to
inconvenience for middle class Americans will be an obstacle to any abortion
for the impoverished. Abortion, the struggle between the rights of mother
and the unborn, encompasses the struggle between the wealthy and the
underprivileged.
RU486 goes to the heart of the abortion debate: the balance between state
legislative action and a woman's right to privacy. Potentially a cheaper and
easier abortion procedure when used correctly, RU486 could make abortions
available for all women. But RU486 must be used carefully - within the
first eight weeks of pregnancy under medical supervision - to protect ma-
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ternal health. This could still be left to a physician's discretion if maternal
health was the only reason to regulate RU486. But the state has the obliga-
tion to protect potential human life as well, whether that protection is
against the mother, doctor, or anyone.
Webster provides little guidance on how to equitably balance the individ-
ual and state rights involved in abortion. Instead, the Webster plurality has
removed the abortion balance from the courts and returned it to the state
legislatures. Direct accountability of state legislatures to their citizens, the
hallmark of the democratic political process, will now direct the struggle
between mother and fetus, both privileged and impoverished.
Eric M Haas
